Lille : the Role of Preachers

Lille : the Role of Preachers

08.06.2010

Here, the ideological re-Islamisation turns Islam into a support of a communitarian strategy seeking to develop a balance of power within French society in order to have shari‘a law adopted in France. This requires reform of Islamic law, but mostly involves a redefinition of fundamental values of democratic and secular citizenship in France.

Entering this perspective, as the young re-Islamised people say, requires being accompanied by mentors: The role of preachers mobilised by the tendencies of re- Islamisation proves to be crucial. The references quoted by the young people generally show their preferences for one of the tendencies of re-Islamisation. However, in some cases, one of the young people quotes, on the one hand, Sheikh Yunis, a famous preacher of the Tabligh and on the other hand, Tariq Ramadan and Hassan Iquioussen, lecturers of the UOIF.

The discourses of these preachers challenge in various forms the young Muslims as actors of a re-Islamisation. The young people interviewed who are involved in this process appreciate, in fact, the “personal search” as proof of access to another Islam, an Islam different from that of their parents’ which is assimilated in traditions. As they point out, their individuality is involved in this process, but this individuality is far from being autonomous. Instead, it is seen as incomplete and in need of being under the guidance of Islam through intermediary mentors, which breaks with the value of autonomy of the so- called Western model. This value is also presented by Islamism as the cause of the breakdown of the relations of the community and the source of moral confusion and social ills. Communitarian Islamism thus reasserts the young people through the upgrading of a Muslim community based on respect of standards and laws of redemption in a world filled with crisis and uncertainty.

“Youth and Islamist Radicalisation”

Lille, France

Investigation

Barack Obama’s Cairo speech

Barack Obama’s Cairo speech

04.06.2009 La rédaction

In this speech , Barack Obama advocates the reconciliation between Muslims and the United States. Despite the needed good will, many have seen a key moment t between the US administration and the Muslim Brotherhood.

I am honoured to be in the timeless city of Cairo, and to be hosted by two remarkable institutions. For over a thousand years, al-Azhar has stood as a beacon of Islamic learning, and for over a century, Cairo University has been a source of Egypt‘s advancement. Together, you represent the harmony between tradition and progress. I am grateful for your hospitality, and the hospitality of the people of Egypt. I am also proud to carry with me the goodwill of the American people, and a greeting of peace from Muslim communities in my country: assalaamu alaykum.

We meet at a time of tension between the United States and Muslims around the world – tension rooted in historical forces that go beyond any current policy debate. The relationship between Islam and the west includes centuries of co-existence and co-operation, but also conflict and religious wars. More recently, tension has been fed by colonialism that denied rights and opportunities to many Muslims, and a cold war in which Muslim-majority countries were too often treated as proxies without regard to their own aspirations. Moreover, the sweeping change brought by modernity and globalisation led many Muslims to view the west as hostile to the traditions of Islam.

Violent extremists have exploited these tensions in a small but potent minority of Muslims. The attacks of September 11 2001 and the continued efforts of these extremists to engage in violence against civilians has led some in my country to view Islam as inevitably hostile not only to America and western countries, but also to human rights. This has bred more fear and mistrust.

So long as our relationship is defined by our differences, we will empower those who sow hatred rather than peace, and who promote conflict rather than the co-operation that can help all of our people achieve justice and prosperity. This cycle of suspicion and discord must end.

I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world; one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect; and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles – principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings.

I do so recognising that change cannot happen overnight. No single speech can eradicate years of mistrust, nor can I answer in the time that I have all the complex questions that brought us to this point. But I am convinced that in order to move forward, we must say openly the things we hold in our hearts, and that too often are said only behind closed doors. There must be a sustained effort to listen to each other; to learn from each other; to respect one another; and to seek common ground. As the Holy Koran tells us: “Be conscious of God and speak always the truth.” That is what I will try to do – to speak the truth as best I can, humbled by the task before us, and firm in my belief that the interests we share as human beings are far more powerful than the forces that drive us apart.

Part of this conviction is rooted in my own experience. I am a Christian, but my father came from a Kenyan family that includes generations of Muslims. As a boy, I spent several years in Indonesia and heard the call of the azaan [the Muslim call to prayer] at the break of dawn and the fall of dusk. As a young man, I worked in Chicago communities where many found dignity and peace in their Muslim faith.

As a student of history, I also know civilization’s debt to Islam. It was Islam – at places like al-Azhar University – that carried the light of learning through so many centuries, paving the way for Europe’s Renaissance and Enlightenment. It was innovation in Muslim communities that developed the order of algebra; our magnetic compass and tools of navigation; our mastery of pens and printing; our understanding of how disease spreads and how it can be healed. Islamic culture has given us majestic arches and soaring spires; timeless poetry and cherished music; elegant calligraphy and places of peaceful contemplation. And throughout history, Islam has demonstrated through words and deeds the possibilities of religious tolerance and racial equality.

I know, too, that Islam has always been a part of America’s story. The first nation to recognise my country was Morocco. In signing the Treaty of Tripoli in 1796, our second President John Adams wrote: “The United States has in itself no character of enmity against the laws, religion or tranquillity of Muslims.” And since our founding, American Muslims have enriched the United States. They have fought in our wars, served in government, stood for civil rights, started businesses, taught at our universities, excelled in our sports arenas, won Nobel prizes, built our tallest building, and lit the Olympic torch. And when the first Muslim-American was recently elected to Congress, he took the oath to defend our constitution using the same Holy Koran that one of our founding fathers – Thomas Jefferson – kept in his personal library.

So I have known Islam on three continents before coming to the region where it was first revealed. That experience guides my conviction that partnership between America and Islam must be based on what Islam is, not what it isn’t. And I consider it part of my responsibility as president of the United States to fight against negative stereotypes of Islam wherever they appear.

But that same principle must apply to Muslim perceptions of America. Just as Muslims do not fit a crude stereotype, America is not the crude stereotype of a self-interested empire. The United States has been one of the greatest sources of progress that the world has ever known. We were born out of revolution against an empire. We were founded upon the ideal that all are created equal, and we have shed blood and struggled for centuries to give meaning to those words – within our borders, and around the world. We are shaped by every culture, drawn from every end of the Earth, and dedicated to a simple concept: E pluribus unum – “Out of many, one.”

Much has been made of the fact that an African-American with the name Barack Hussein Obama could be elected president. But my personal story is not so unique. The dream of opportunity for all people has not come true for everyone in America, but its promise exists for all who come to our shores – that includes nearly 7 million American Muslims in our country today who enjoy incomes and education that are higher than average.

Moreover, freedom in America is indivisible from the freedom to practise one’s religion. That is why there is a mosque in every state of our union, and over 1,200 mosques within our borders. That is why the US government has gone to court to protect the right of women and girls to wear the hijab, and to punish those who would deny it.

So let there be no doubt: Islam is a part of America. And I believe that America holds within her the truth that regardless of race, religion, or station in life, all of us share common aspirations – to live in peace and security; to get an education and to work with dignity; to love our families, our communities, and our God. These things we share. This is the hope of all humanity.

Of course, recognising our common humanity is only the beginning of our task. Words alone cannot meet the needs of our people. These needs will be met only if we act boldly in the years ahead; and if we understand that the challenges we face are shared, and our failure to meet them will hurt us all.

For we have learned from recent experience that when a financial system weakens in one country, prosperity is hurt everywhere. When a new flu infects one human being, all are at risk. When one nation pursues a nuclear weapon, the risk of nuclear attack rises for all nations. When violent extremists operate in one stretch of mountains, people are endangered across an ocean. And when innocents in Bosnia and Darfur are slaughtered, that is a stain on our collective conscience. That is what it means to share this world in the 21st century. That is the responsibility we have to one another as human beings.

This is a difficult responsibility to embrace. For human history has often been a record of nations and tribes subjugating one another to serve their own interests. Yet in this new age, such attitudes are self-defeating. Given our interdependence, any world order that elevates one nation or group of people over another will inevitably fail. So whatever we think of the past, we must not be prisoners of it. Our problems must be dealt with through partnership; progress must be shared.

That does not mean we should ignore sources of tension. Indeed, it suggests the opposite: we must face these tensions squarely. And so in that spirit, let me speak as clearly and plainly as I can about some specific issues that I believe we must finally confront together.

The first issue that we have to confront is violent extremism in all of its forms.

In Ankara, I made clear that America is not – and never will be – at war with Islam. We will, however, relentlessly confront violent extremists who pose a grave threat to our security. Because we reject the same thing that people of all faiths reject: the killing of innocent men, women, and children. And it is my first duty as president to protect the American people.

The situation in Afghanistan demonstrates America’s goals, and our need to work together. Over seven years ago, the United States pursued al-Qaida and the Taliban with broad international support. We did not go by choice, we went because of necessity. I am aware that some question or justify the events of 9/11. But let us be clear: al-Qaida killed nearly 3,000 people on that day. The victims were innocent men, women and children from America and many other nations who had done nothing to harm anybody. And yet al-Qaida chose to ruthlessly murder these people, claimed credit for the attack, and even now states their determination to kill on a massive scale. They have affiliates in many countries and are trying to expand their reach. These are not opinions to be debated; these are facts to be dealt with.

Make no mistake: we do not want to keep our troops in Afghanistan. We seek no military bases there. It is agonising for America to lose our young men and women. It is costly and politically difficult to continue this conflict. We would gladly bring every single one of our troops home if we could be confident that there were not violent extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan determined to kill as many Americans as they possibly can. But that is not yet the case.

That’s why we’re partnering with a coalition of 46 countries. And despite the costs involved, America’s commitment will not weaken. Indeed, none of us should tolerate these extremists. They have killed in many countries. They have killed people of different faiths – more than any other, they have killed Muslims. Their actions are irreconcilable with the rights of human beings, the progress of nations, and with Islam. The Holy Koran teaches that whoever kills an innocent, it is as if he has killed all mankind; and whoever saves a person, it is as if he has saved all mankind. The enduring faith of over a billion people is so much bigger than the narrow hatred of a few. Islam is not part of the problem in combating violent extremism – it is an important part of promoting peace.

We also know that military power alone is not going to solve the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That is why we plan to invest $1.5bn (£914m) each year over the next five years to partner with Pakistanis to build schools and hospitals, roads and businesses, and hundreds of millions to help those who have been displaced. And that is why we are providing more than $2.8bn to help Afghans develop their economy and deliver services that people depend upon.

Let me also address the issue of Iraq. Unlike Afghanistan, Iraq was a war of choice that provoked strong differences in my country and around the world. Although I believe that the Iraqi people are ultimately better off without the tyranny of Saddam Hussein, I also believe that events in Iraq have reminded America of the need to use diplomacy and build international consensus to resolve our problems whenever possible. Indeed, we can recall the words of Thomas Jefferson, who said: “I hope that our wisdom will grow with our power, and teach us that the less we use our power the greater it will be.”

Today, America has a dual responsibility: to help Iraq forge a better future – and to leave Iraq to Iraqis. I have made it clear to the Iraqi people that we pursue no bases, and no claim on their territory or resources. Iraq‘s sovereignty is its own. That is why I ordered the removal of our combat brigades by next August. That is why we will honour our agreement with Iraq‘s democratically elected government to remove combat troops from Iraqi cities by July, and to remove all our troops from Iraq by 2012. We will help Iraq train its security forces and develop its economy. But we will support a secure and united Iraq as a partner, and never as a patron.

And finally, just as America can never tolerate violence by extremists, we must never alter our principles. 9/11 was an enormous trauma to our country. The fear and anger that it provoked was understandable, but in some cases, it led us to act contrary to our ideals. We are taking concrete actions to change course. I have unequivocally prohibited the use of torture by the United States, and I have ordered the prison at Guantánamo Bay closed by early next year.

So America will defend itself, respectful of the sovereignty of nations and the rule of law. And we will do so in partnership with Muslim communities which are also threatened. The sooner the extremists are isolated and unwelcome in Muslim communities, the sooner we will all be safer.

The second major source of tension that we need to discuss is the situation between Israelis, Palestinians and the Arab world.

America’s strong bonds with Israel are well known. This bond is unbreakable. It is based upon cultural and historical ties, and the recognition that the aspiration for a Jewish homeland is rooted in a tragic history that cannot be denied.

Around the world, the Jewish people were persecuted for centuries, and antisemitism in Europe culminated in an unprecedented Holocaust. Tomorrow, I will visit Buchenwald, which was part of a network of camps where Jews were enslaved, tortured, shot and gassed to death by the Third Reich. Six million Jews were killed – more than the entire Jewish population of Israel today. Denying that fact is baseless, ignorant, and hateful. Threatening Israel with destruction – or repeating vile stereotypes about Jews – is deeply wrong, and only serves to evoke in the minds of Israelis this most painful of memories while preventing the peace that the people of this region deserve.

On the other hand, it is also undeniable that the Palestinian people – Muslims and Christians – have suffered in pursuit of a homeland. For more than 60 years they have endured the pain of dislocation. Many wait in refugee camps in the West Bank, Gaza, and neighbouring lands for a life of peace and security that they have never been able to lead. They endure the daily humiliations – large and small – that come with occupation. So let there be no doubt: the situation for the Palestinian people is intolerable. America will not turn our backs on the legitimate Palestinian aspiration for dignity, opportunity, and a state of their own.

For decades, there has been a stalemate: two peoples with legitimate aspirations, each with a painful history that makes compromise elusive. It is easy to point fingers – for Palestinians to point to the displacement brought by Israel‘s founding and for Israelis to point to the constant hostility and attacks throughout its history from within its borders as well as beyond. But if we see this conflict only from one side or the other, then we will be blind to the truth: the only resolution is for the aspirations of both sides to be met through two states, where Israelis and Palestinians each live in peace and security.

That is in Israel‘s interest, Palestine‘s interest, America’s interest, and the world’s interest. That is why I intend to personally pursue this outcome with all the patience that the task requires. The obligations that the parties have agreed to under the road map are clear. For peace to come, it is time for them – and all of us – to live up to our responsibilities.

Palestinians must abandon violence. Resistance through violence and killing is wrong and does not succeed. For centuries, black people in America suffered the lash of the whip as slaves and the humiliation of segregation. But it was not violence that won full and equal rights. It was a peaceful and determined insistence upon the ideals at the centre of America’s founding. This same story can be told by people from South Africa to South Asia; from eastern Europe to Indonesia. It’s a story with a simple truth: that violence is a dead end. It is a sign of neither courage nor power to shoot rockets at sleeping children, or to blow up old women on a bus. That is not how moral authority is claimed; that is how it is surrendered.

Now is the time for Palestinians to focus on what they can build. The Palestinian Authority must develop its capacity to govern, with institutions that serve the needs of its people. Hamas does have support among some Palestinians, but they also have responsibilities. To play a role in fulfilling Palestinian aspirations, and to unify the Palestinian people, Hamas must put an end to violence, recognise past agreements, and recognise Israel‘s right to exist.

At the same time, Israelis must acknowledge that just as Israel‘s right to exist cannot be denied, neither can Palestine‘s. The United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements. This construction violates previous agreements and undermines efforts to achieve peace. It is time for these settlements to stop.

Israel must also live up to its obligations to ensure that Palestinians can live, and work, and develop their society. And just as it devastates Palestinian families, the continuing humanitarian crisis in Gaza does not serve Israel‘s security; neither does the continuing lack of opportunity in the West Bank. Progress in the daily lives of the Palestinian people must be part of a road to peace, and Israel must take concrete steps to enable such progress.

Finally, the Arab states must recognize that the Arab Peace Initiative was an important beginning, but not the end of their responsibilities. The Arab-Israeli conflict should no longer be used to distract the people of Arab nations from other problems. Instead, it must be a cause for action to help the Palestinian people develop the institutions that will sustain their state; to recognise Israel‘s legitimacy; and to choose progress over a self-defeating focus on the past.

America will align our policies with those who pursue peace, and say in public what we say in private to Israelis and Palestinians and Arabs. We cannot impose peace. But privately, many Muslims recognise that Israel will not go away. Likewise, many Israelis recognise the need for a Palestinian state. It is time for us to act on what everyone knows to be true.

Too many tears have flowed. Too much blood has been shed. All of us have a responsibility to work for the day when the mothers of Israelis and Palestinians can see their children grow up without fear; when the Holy Land of three great faiths is the place of peace that God intended it to be; when Jerusalem is a secure and lasting home for Jews and Christians and Muslims, and a place for all of the children of Abraham to mingle peacefully together as in the story of Isra, when Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed (peace be upon them) joined in prayer.

The third source of tension is our shared interest in the rights and responsibilities of nations on nuclear weapons.

This issue has been a source of tension between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. For many years, Iran has defined itself in part by its opposition to my country, and there is indeed a tumultuous history between us. In the middle of the cold war, the United States played a role in the overthrow of a democratically elected Iranian government. Since the Islamic revolution, Iran has played a role in acts of hostage-taking and violence against US troops and civilians. This history is well known. Rather than remain trapped in the past, I have made it clear to Iran‘s leaders and people that my country is prepared to move forward. The question, now, is not what Iran is against, but rather what future it wants to build.

It will be hard to overcome decades of mistrust, but we will proceed with courage, rectitude and resolve. There will be many issues to discuss between our two countries, and we are willing to move forward without preconditions on the basis of mutual respect. But it is clear to all concerned that when it comes to nuclear weapons, we have reached a decisive point. This is not simply about America’s interests. It is about preventing a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that could lead this region and the world down a hugely dangerous path.

I understand those who protest that some countries have weapons that others do not. No single nation should pick and choose which nations hold nuclear weapons. That is why I strongly reaffirmed America’s commitment to seek a world in which no nations hold nuclear weapons. And any nation – including Iran – should have the right to access peaceful nuclear power if it complies with its responsibilities under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. That commitment is at the core of the treaty, and it must be kept for all who fully abide by it. And I am hopeful that all countries in the region can share in this goal.

The fourth issue that I will address is democracy.

I know there has been controversy about the promotion of democracy in recent years, and much of this controversy is connected to the war in Iraq. So let me be clear: no system of government can or should be imposed upon one nation by any other.

That does not lessen my commitment, however, to governments that reflect the will of the people. Each nation gives life to this principle in its own way, grounded in the traditions of its own people. America does not presume to know what is best for everyone, just as we would not presume to pick the outcome of a peaceful election. But I do have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people; the freedom to live as you choose. Those are not just American ideas, they are human rights, and that is why we will support them everywhere.

There is no straight line to realise this promise. But this much is clear: governments that protect these rights are ultimately more stable, successful and secure. Suppressing ideas never succeeds in making them go away. America respects the right of all peaceful and law-abiding voices to be heard around the world, even if we disagree with them. And we will welcome all elected, peaceful governments – provided they govern with respect for all their people.

This last point is important because there are some who advocate for democracy only when they are out of power; once in power, they are ruthless in suppressing the rights of others. No matter where it takes hold, government of the people and by the people sets a single standard for all who hold power: you must maintain your power through consent, not coercion; you must respect the rights of minorities, and participate with a spirit of tolerance and compromise; you must place the interests of your people and the legitimate workings of the political process above your party. Without these ingredients, elections alone do not make true democracy.

The fifth issue that we must address together is religious freedom.

Islam has a proud tradition of tolerance. We see it in the history of Andalusia and Cordoba during the Inquisition. I saw it first-hand as a child in Indonesia, where devout Christians worshipped freely in an overwhelmingly Muslim country. That is the spirit we need today. People in every country should be free to choose and live their faith based upon the persuasion of the mind, heart, and soul. This tolerance is essential for religion to thrive, but it is being challenged in many different ways.

Among some Muslims, there is a disturbing tendency to measure one’s own faith by the rejection of another’s. The richness of religious diversity must be upheld – whether it is for Maronites in Lebanon or the Copts in Egypt. And fault lines must be closed among Muslims as well, as the divisions between Sunni and Shia have led to tragic violence, particularly in Iraq.

Freedom of religion is central to the ability of peoples to live together. We must always examine the ways in which we protect it. For instance, in the United States, rules on charitable giving have made it harder for Muslims to fulfill their religious obligation. That is why I am committed to working with American Muslims to ensure that they can fulfil zakat.

Likewise, it is important for western countries to avoid impeding Muslim citizens from practising religion as they see fit– for instance, by dictating what clothes a Muslim woman should wear. We cannot disguise hostility towards any religion behind the pretence of liberalism.

Indeed, faith should bring us together. That is why we are forging service projects in America that bring together Christians, Muslims, and Jews. That is why we welcome efforts like Saudi Arabian King Abdullah‘s Interfaith dialogue and Turkey’s leadership in the Alliance of Civilizations. Around the world, we can turn dialogue into interfaith service, so bridges between peoples lead to action– whether it is combating malaria in Africa, or providing relief after a natural disaster.

The sixth issue that I want to address is women’s rights.

I know there is debate about this issue. I reject the view of some in the west that a woman who chooses to cover her hair is somehow less equal, but I do believe that a woman who is denied an education is denied equality. And it is no coincidence that countries where women are well-educated are far more likely to be prosperous.

Now let me be clear: issues of women’s equality are by no means simply an issue for Islam. In Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia, we have seen Muslim-majority countries elect a woman to lead. Meanwhile, the struggle for women’s equality continues in many aspects of American life, and in countries around the world.

Our daughters can contribute just as much to society as our sons, and our common prosperity will be advanced by allowing all humanity – men and women – to reach their full potential. I do not believe that women must make the same choices as men in order to be equal, and I respect those women who choose to live their lives in traditional roles. But it should be their choice. That is why the United States will partner with any Muslim-majority country to support expanded literacy for girls, and to help young women pursue employment through micro-financing that helps people live their dreams.

Finally, I want to discuss economic development and opportunity.

I know that for many, the face of globalisation is contradictory. The internet and television can bring knowledge and information, but also offensive sexuality and mindless violence. Trade can bring new wealth and opportunities, but also huge disruptions and changing communities. In all nations – including my own – this change can bring fear. Fear that because of modernity we will lose of control over our economic choices, our politics, and most importantly our identities – those things we most cherish about our communities, our families, our traditions, and our faith.

But I also know that human progress cannot be denied. There need not be contradiction between development and tradition. Countries like Japan and South Korea grew their economies while maintaining distinct cultures. The same is true for the astonishing progress within Muslim-majority countries from Kuala Lumpur to Dubai. In ancient times and in our times, Muslim communities have been at the forefront of innovation and education.

This is important because no development strategy can be based only upon what comes out of the ground, nor can it be sustained while young people are out of work. Many Gulf States have enjoyed great wealth as a consequence of oil, and some are beginning to focus it on broader development. But all of us must recognise that education and innovation will be the currency of the 21st century, and in too many Muslim communities there remains underinvestment in these areas. I am emphasising such investments within my country. And while America in the past has focused on oil and gas in this part of the world, we now seek a broader engagement.

On education, we will expand exchange programmes, and increase scholarships, like the one that brought my father to America, while encouraging more Americans to study in Muslim communities. And we will match promising Muslim students with internships in America; invest in online learning for teachers and children around the world; and create a new online network, so a teenager in Kansas can communicate instantly with a teenager in Cairo.

On economic development, we will create a new corps of business volunteers to partner with counterparts in Muslim-majority countries. And I will host a summit on entrepreneurship this year to identify how we can deepen ties between business leaders, foundations and social entrepreneurs in the United States and Muslim communities around the world.

On science and technology, we will launch a new fund to support technological development in Muslim-majority countries, and to help transfer ideas to the marketplace so they can create jobs. We will open centres of scientific excellence in Africa, the Middle East and south-east Asia, and appoint new science envoys to collaborate on programmes that develop new sources of energy, create green jobs, digitise records, clean wate and grow new crops. And today I am announcing a new global effort with the Organisation of the Islamic Conference to eradicate polio. And we will also expand partnerships with Muslim communities to promote child and maternal health.

All these things must be done in partnership. Americans are ready to join with citizens and governments; community organisations, religious leaders, and businesses in Muslim communities around the world to help our people pursue a better life.

The issues that I have described will not be easy to address. But we have a responsibility to join together on behalf of the world we seek – a world where extremists no longer threaten our people, and American troops have come home; a world where Israelis and Palestinians are each secure in a state of their own, and nuclear energy is used for peaceful purposes; a world where governments serve their citizens, and the rights of all God’s children are respected. Those are mutual interests. That is the world we seek. But we can only achieve it together.

I know there are many – Muslim and non-Muslim – who question whether we can forge this new beginning. Some are eager to stoke the flames of division, and to stand in the way of progress. Some suggest that it isn’t worth the effort – that we are fated to disagree, and civilisations are doomed to clash. Many more are simply skeptical that real change can occur. There is so much fear, so much mistrust. But if we choose to be bound by the past, we will never move forward. And I want to particularly say this to young people of every faith, in every country – you, more than anyone, have the ability to remake this world.

All of us share this world for but a brief moment in time. The question is whether we spend that time focused on what pushes us apart, or whether we commit ourselves to an effort – a sustained effort _ to find common ground, to focus on the future we seek for our children, and to respect the dignity of all human beings.

It is easier to start wars than to end them. It is easier to blame others than to look inward; to see what is different about someone than to find the things we share. But we should choose the right path, not just the easy path. There is also one rule that lies at the heart of every religion – that we do unto others as we would have them do unto us. This truth transcends nations and peoples – a belief that isn’t new; that isn’t black or white or brown; that isn’t Christian, or Muslim or Jew. It’s a belief that pulsed in the cradle of civilisation, and that still beats in the heart of billions. It’s a faith in other people, and it’s what brought me here today.

We have the power to make the world we seek, but only if we have the courage to make a new beginning, keeping in mind what has been written.

The Holy Koran tells u: “O mankind! We have created you male and a female; and we have made you into nations and tribes so that you may know one another.”

The Talmud tells us: “The whole of the Torah is for the purpose of promoting peace.”

The Holy Bible tells us: “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God.”

The people of the world can live together in peace. We know that is God’s vision. Now, that must be our work here on Earth. Thank you. And may God’s peace be upon you.

Documents

Strong word in private between Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed and the US

Strong word in private between Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed and the US 25.02.2009 La rédaction

Below, are diplomatic cables revealed by Wikileaks. They were sent by US ambassadors to their colleagues and/or to the US State Department. 

We are aware that these were meant to be private conversations and by making them public Wikileaks violates their author’s and other people’s privacy. We chose to publish them anyway on this website because they show the evolution of the United State‘s position concerning the Muslim Brotherhood

We do consider them as historical documents and publish them as such, we will therefore not reproduce any confidential cables leaked after 2010. 1. (S/NF) Summary: On the margins of Abu Dhabi’s largest defense exhibition (IDEX), Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) engaged visiting US dignitaries with strident remarks about Iran and Qatar‘s dangerous ties to extremist elements (including Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood). He stated flatly that Qatar is allied with the Brotherhood (posited as the UAEG‘s mortal enemy) and clearly betrayed the GCC by inviting Iran to the January “Arab” summit. MbZ cited his own desire to defend his country as a counterpoint to extremists’ loyalty to their “movement” as opposed to their constituent population. He expressed skepticism about the ability of the GCC to cooperate in the military sphere, and urged the US to work with individual countries bilaterally as a way of moving the process forward. Praising the UAE Air Force in ensuring national defense, he said his officers had instructions to find and be ready to stamp out Iranian missiles. He was morbidly confident that Israel would attempt a military strike on Iran this year, likely provoking Tehran to lash out at proximate targets like the UAE (identified as a partner of Israel‘s U.S. ally). He was also harsh on Russia‘s role in the region, as it followed its hero (Putin) in citing its villain (America) as the source of its woes. He predicted unhelpful cooperation between Moscow and Tehran. Closing the meeting on a more upbeat note, MbZ was pleased with the assurance that the U.S. Navy was in the Gulf and hoped it would remain here for generations. End summary. 2. (C) During the bi-annual International Defence Exhibition 2009 (IDEX) held in Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan (MbZ) met with the official US Delegation, US Ambassador Richard Olson, US Defense Attache colonel Bret Rider and Chief US Liaison Office Colonel David Sprague on site at IDEX. Key members of the US delegation consisted of VADM William Gortney (CDR NAVCENT), Mr. Keith Webster (DASA/DE&C), Ms. Beth McCormick (Dep Dir DSCA), BG Genaro Dellerocco (USA PEO Missiles & Space), BG Michael Terry (CDR USASAC), and RDML Steven Voetsch (A/SECNAV/IP). The discussions were broad-ranging but typically centered on, or arose in conjunction with, naval operations in the Arabian Gulf. As is usually the case, Iran was the true center of the discussion. Qatar aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood —————————————– 3. (S/NF) Perhaps the most revealing part of the discussion was on the subject of Qatar, as it relates to Iran. MbZ asked note-takers on both sides to stop writing and to keep his comments off the record as he stated that Qatar is “part of the Muslim Brotherhood.” He encouraged the US to review the employees of Al Jazeera and predicted we’d find 90% of the staff affiliated with the Brotherhood. When Qatar invited Iran to the Arab League meeting (January 16), MbZ saw that as a betrayal of the first caliber. He stated he knows Hamid bin Khalifa and Hamid bin Jasim well and he could not understand why they would betray fellow Arabs unless they were beholden to the Muslim Brothers. He cited as proof of Qatari perfidy that Doha gave Hamas and Hizballah $930 million. He asked rhetorically why else would an Arab leader support movements like this unless they were part of the movement. 4. (S/NF) In a further example linking Iran and Qatar, MbZ told the story of the Moroccan Foreign Minister who received a call from Iran. The FM was directed (by Iran) to work with Doha and agree with what they propose. The FM told the Iranian that he would listen to his boss, the King of Morocco, and not a Persian who had no say in the matter. (Comment: the real point of the story was to illustrate the inroads that Iran has already made into the Arab League thanks to Qatar. End comment.) 5. (S/NF) The discussion on Qatar led to a broader MbZ condemnation of the Muslim Brotherhood movement and its affect on the region. (Being labeled a Muslim Brother is about the worst epithet possible in MBZ vocabulary.) He sees Iranian influence in the Brotherhood very clearly as both a way to agitate the Arab populace and render the traditional leaders of Arab society impotent. MbZ spoke of Hamas and Hizballah in the same breath and grouped them with UBL as transnational threats posing as national movements. He used the story of Khalid Mishal‘s visit to Egypt as the most recent example of nefarious intent. Mishal was invited on an official visit by President Hosni Mubarak, including arrangements for housing Mishal in the fashion he accords national leaders. Mishal reportedly rejected the offer and told Mubarak that he would stay with “his boss,” the leader of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood and avowed enemy of Mubarak. “Why was the leader of a Palestinian faction calling the leader of an Egyptian terrorist organization his boss?” Borders and nations do not matter to these people, said MbZ, just the movement. On the other hand, the UAE as a nation is very important to MbZ and he sees it as his duty to maintain its integrity. GCC cohesion a myth ——————- 6. (S) Admiral Gortney talked of military coalitions and multinational exercises as a way to prepare for unforeseen eventualities, especially as regards Iran. MbZ was very quick to respond that he had tried to forge GCC cohesion for “27 years” and failed. “I am not a believer in grouping the GCC together…ask us who wants to be involved and we will step forward, the others will take a step back.” “Encourage those of us who wish to lead to lead and we will; sooner or later the others will step forward but only when it is necessary.” The message was very clear: the UAE should be should be dealt with bilaterally by the US, not as a constituent part of the GCC or Arab world. Additionally, he suggested the US is wasting its time trying to get the other members of the GCC to cooperate in the common interest, when that is not the primary motivation of most GCC states. Admiral Gortney thanked MbZ for the UAE Navy’s plans to command CTF 152 later this year. This is a clear indication the UAE will lead when given the opportunity. The UAE‘s leadership of the CTF will convince those who are not committed to the coalition to join and support this key effort in the Arabian Gulf. Extremists prey on young minds prone to fantasy ——————————————— — 7. (C) MbZ stated the UAE has two enemies, Iran and terrorism. It is important to him that when one side of a partnership has information on either of these threats they must share it for the common good of both. He told the story of his son who was becoming interested in the teachings of Muslim fundamentalists; he sent his son on a humanitarian mission to Ethiopia but not with the Red Crescent, rather with the Red Cross. His son returned from the mission with his vision of the west intact and in fact corrected. He was astonished that the Christians with the Red Cross were giving food and support to anyone who needed the support, not just to Christians. His son had only heard the stories of the west through the lens of Al Jazeera and others similarly aligned. In a message often heard from MbZ he stressed that no true religion tells anyone to kill innocents. No true religion tells anyone to be a suicide bomber. The fantasy of being a martyr for Islam and riding a golden chariot to heaven to live in a 7-star hotel to be waited on by 70 virgins is just that, a fantasy exploited by extremists. Strengthening defenses — against Iran‘s missiles ——————————————— —- 8. (S/NF) MbZ spoke proudly of his Air Force and its role in the nation’s defense. He stated “this is the Middle East and we will do what we need to do…when the Iranians fire their missiles we will go after them and kill them.” He said he feels the worst thing he can do as a leader is to allow the Iranians to attack his people and then to have no answer when young Emiratis ask “what are you going to do?” He stated with some certainty this is the year the Israelis will attack Iran. He believes Iran will have two possible courses of action; sit back and do nothing, and have the world so thoroughly condemn the actions of Israel that Iran becomes the hero for not responding to an “unprovoked” attack. MbZ feels the more likely Iranian reaction to an Israeli attack would be to let loose its missiles on the allies of those who support Israel (i.e., close partners of the U.S.). He sees the UAE at the top of the Iranian target list. MbZ told Admiral Gortney that he has directed his Armed Forces Chief of Staff (COS) to find the missiles now and draw up plans to kill them. The COS was directed to work with the Americans so the UAE‘s jets have the corridors and experience needed to make the kill. (Note: Septel reports the COS‘s appeal for urgent deployment of Patriot batteries in the UAE. End note.) Down on Russia <————– 9. (S/NF) After Ambassador delivered ref B points, MbZ spoke of the destabilizing effect of the Russians particularly in light of the purported S-300 missile sale to Iran. He said Russians are very difficult to convince of anything. Russians need two things, a hero and a villain. They now have a hero in Putin and they are once again making America the villain. MbZ recalled that Putin announced in 2008 that Russia had huge financial reserves and would not suffer under the economic collapse, but now the reserves are gone. The Russian “hero” tells his people daily that America is the reason for the high price of bread in Moscow, America is the reason for the low price of oil, etc. MbZ said 2009 will be a very bad year for Russia, whose people will turn to their hero more and more. He thinks we need to control the Russians but said he is not well versed in dealing with Russia — America knows how to deal with Russia from past experience and America must deal with Russia now. Russia will be the biggest winner of any instability in the Gulf; Iran will use Russia to re-build after Israel attacks. MbZ asked Ambassador for his assessment of Russian intentions, Ambassador described the challenges the US had faced in dealing with Russia since Putin‘s 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference. Upbeat on the U.S. Naval presence ——————————— 10. (C) The meeting ended as it started, with MbZ as the gracious and upbeat host wishing his guests well and wishing American business the greatest successes during IDEX. His mood was relaxed and confident and looking to the future. When Admiral Gortney noted that the US Navy has been here in the Gulf for 60 years, MbZ commented that he’s been hearing that for over 40 years and his fondest hope is that he continues to hear that for 40 more — and that his children will hear the same message from America. 11. (SBU) Vice Admiral William Gortney, Commander NAVCENT, cleared this cable prior to its transmission. OLSON STRONG WORDS IN PRIVATE FROM MBZ AT IDEX — BASHES IRAN, QATAR, RUSSIA Date: 2009 February 25, 12:50 (Wednesday) Canonical ID: 09ABUDHABI193_a Original Classification: SECRET,NOFORN Current Classification: SECRET,NOFORN Handling Restrictions — Not Assigned — Character Count: 11467 Executive Order: — Not Assigned — Locator: TEXT ONLINE TAGS:AE – United Arab Emirates | IR – Iran |MASS – Military and Defense Affairs–Military Assistance and Sales |MOPS – Military and Defense Affairs–Military Operations | PARM – Political Affairs–Arms Controls and Disarmament | PREL – Political Affairs–External Political Relations |PTER – Political Affairs–Terrorists and Terrorism | QA – Qatar | RU – RussiaConcepts:— Not Assigned —Enclosure: — Not Assigned — Type: TE Office Origin: — N/A or Blank — Office Action: — N/A or Blank — Archive Status: — Not Assigned — From:United Arab Emirates Abu DhabiMarkings: — Not Assigned — To:CJCS WASHINGTON DC Defense Intelligence Agency Iran Iran Collective | Joint Chiefs of Staff North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Russia Moscow | Secretary of Defense Secretary of State The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf United States Central Command 

Documents

ISLAMISTS in PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN JORDAN

ISLAMISTS in PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN JORDAN

12.06.2008 La rédaction

Wikileaks published this cable send by the American embassy in Jordan to the State department regarding the influence of Muslim Brotherhood in refugee camps in Jordan.

PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN JORDAN, PART 4: ISLAMISTS AND THE PULL OF EXTREMISM
Date: 2008 June 12, 06:43 (Thursday) Canonical ID: 08AMMAN1753_a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL Current Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Handling Restrictions — Not Assigned — Character Count: 21811
Executive Order: — Not Assigned — Locator: TEXT ONLINE
TAGS: ECON – Economic Affairs–Economic Conditions, Trends and Potential | JO- Jordan | KISL – Islamic Issues |KPAL – Palestinian Affairs | KREF |PGOV – Political Affairs–Government; Internal Governmental Affairs Concepts: — Not Assigned —
Enclosure: — Not Assigned — Type: TE
Office Origin: — N/A or Blank — Office Action: — N/A or Blank — Archive Status: — Not Assigned —
From: Jordan Amman Markings: — Not Assigned —
To: Group Destinations Arab Israeli Collective | Secretary of State 

Content Raw content Metadata Print Share Show Headers B. AMMAN 1466 C. AMMAN 391 D. 07 AMMAN 4430 E. AMMAN 1724 F. AMMAN 1725 G. AMMAN 1744 Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (SBU) Note: This is the fourth cable of a four-part series examining the world of Jordan’s Palestinian refugee camps. Part one focused on the different categories of refugees, and the basic structure of the camp system as it exists in Jordan. Part two examined the isolation of the camps – how they are largely cut off from Jordanian society, politics, and economics. Part three looked at the economic situation of the camps and their inhabitants, particularly in light of recent strains on Jordan’s economy. Part four examines Islamist politics and extremism in the camps. These cables are the result of focus group meetings with diverse residents of nine camps in Jordan. End Note. 2. (C) Summary: The political and social position of Islamists in Palestinian refugee camps is nuanced and complicated. Despite recent electoral setbacks, Islamists dominate the political life of the camps. The appeal of the Islamists is due in large part to their integration into the social network of the camps rather than the influence of charities run by the Muslim Brotherhood. Even so, economics is a factor that cannot be ignored when assessing the roots of political and social support for Islamist groups. Islamists have also filled a political void in the camps by championing the Palestinian cause. Theories about the decline of political Islam in the camps are ill-founded and little more than wishful thinking, although there are some long-term trends that may allow for a political shift. People in the camps see support for terrorism as a social problem with multiple causes. End Summary. The IAF’s Base 3. (C) Despite recent electoral setbacks and public displays of disunity (Ref A), the Muslim Brotherhood is still the primary political force in the camps. The Brotherhood’s political arm, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), is the party that most contacts in the camps look to represent their interests. Note: Not all camp residents can vote. The gradations of Jordanian citizenship are described in Ref B. End Note. Jordanian elites have a series of theories about why this is the case – they assume that residents of the camps support the IAF out of ignorance, lack of other political options, or because they are heavily influenced by power brokers. Yet our contacts in the camps paint a picture that is more nuanced and complex. 4. (C) Ahmad Awad, the UNRWA camp services officer in Baqa’a Camp, maintains that the IAF genuinely represents the political preferences of camp residents. Discussions with residents of the camps bear this out – they talk freely about the solidarity they feel with the IAF’s view of the world, both in their canned diatribes and in franker private conversations. Our contacts particularly stress that Islam is a critical pillar of daily life, not just in the mosque but in the community and in the relationship with the state. It is clear that religion is a core element of their worldview – one that informs their political beliefs just as much as it informs their social lives. Said Ajawi, a resident of Irbid camp, put it simply: “No country, no people, no land…God is all we have left.” 5. (C) Part of the natural appeal of the IAF in the camps is that some of its main proponents, the imams and clerics, hold positions of social and cultural authority and are considered pillars of the community. “They are in a place of trust,” says Abu Ra’ed Darash, a resident of Zarqa camp. “Those who believe in Islam must be good people.” Government contacts frequently note that it is hard for them to compete with Islamists who can reach their target audience five times every day. Note: For example, Royal Court Chief Bassem Awadallah recently made such an argument to a visiting delegation, adding that the “mosque was more important than media outlets.” End Note. Contacts in the camps essentially confirm this – even though contact with religious authorities is more often than not an interaction that has little to do with politics or economics. Yet for those who are interested in those topics, there is ample opportunity to engage with the Islamist point of view. An Emotional Bond AMMAN 00001753 002 OF 005 —————- 6. (C) Equal to, if not more important than, the social position of IAF members is the fact that the party is an integral part of the social and economic network of the camp. “The IAF follows the minute daily details of our society. They know when people get married. They know when people have children. They are involved in all of this. They are experts,” Awad notes. Residents of the Jebel Hussein camp talk about Muslim Brotherhood-linked charities helping out with funeral expenses, and creating an “adopt an orphan” program that assists the camp’s most vulnerable children to attend school. 7. (C) The IAF’s use of Muslim Brotherhood-linked charitable organizations is frequently cited in the Jordanian and international media as the hook that is used to create electoral leverage with residents of the camps. In talking to residents of the camps, it is certainly the case that the charities create an emotional bond in addition to any economic one. The camps are tightly knit communities that are largely isolated from the rest of Jordanian society. In this context, person-to-person contact is what drives the social (and therefore political) preferences of people in the camps. “It is important to look at the closeness people feel with the (IAF) candidates,” says Suzan Ladhabit of Jebel Hussein camp. On the other side, residents of the camps talk about alienation from the Jordanian government. Awad asserts: “The government is not part of the social network of the camps. They deal with the residents of the camps only through rigid procedures, not on a human level.” Manufacturing Consent 8. (C) This is not to say that economic considerations are not part of the equation. Awad says that monetary and other aid funneled through Muslim Brotherhood-oriented charities is more than that given by the so-called “safety net” of UNRWA and the Jordanian government combined. People from the Jebel Hussein camp talk about the restrictive, paperwork-heavy process of obtaining assistance from the Jordanian government and UNRWA, comparing it unfavorably with the targeted, immediate, and relatively bureaucracy-free assistance they receive from Islamist charities. 9. (C) A prime example of the perceived inflexibility of international aid to people in the camps is a rule (recently eliminated by the Jordanian government for its own assistance, but still in place for UNRWA) that families cannot receive economic assistance if even one of their male children is over nineteen years old and not studying, serving in the military, or in jail. It was originally assumed that this “breadwinner” status would allow older children to begin work, thereby sharing the proceeds of their labor with their families and pushing the family towards self-sufficiency. Yet for families with many children, the reaching of that majority age by the eldest son or daughter can have a disastrous impact on family finances. “If a family of seven kids has even one nineteen-year-old, they’re sunk,” says Salam Hamdan. Contacts indicate that Islamist charities then rush in to fill this gap, propping up families who would otherwise fall through the cracks. 10. (C) Residents of the camps realize that there are ideological strings attached to aid flows from Islamist charities. “In principle, humanitarian aid is the goal, but ideology also comes with it,” says Afaf Mejdelawi of Zarqa camp. Still, economic desperation leads people in the camps to take whatever they can get, regardless of what is said in their names as a result. “There is simply no other way,” says Abu Ra’ed Darash, also from Zarqa camp. In addition, recipients of economic assistance from Islamist charities have little knowledge about where it originates. Since the Muslim Brotherhood’s charities receive funding primarily as anonymously donated zakat (alms for the poor which are required of all Muslims), there is rarely a connection between benefactor and recipient. “We don’t know exactly where the money (from Islamist charities) comes from,” says Ibrahim Natour of Baqa’a camp. “We assume that it comes from outside the camp, since people here are too poor to donate that kind of money.” 11. (C) Residents of the camps are grateful for any kind of economic assistance, and have a keen sense of what money can be squeezed from what source. While they bash American policy freely and openly, contacts in the camps are always careful to note that America “helps them” economically through its contributions to UNRWA. They are very aware of the health centers and schools that American money constructs, and are not shy about asking for funds for future projects. (“Tell Congress…” is a constant refrain.) Note: AMMAN 00001753 003 OF 005 One resident of Souf camp wondered why American funding flowed indirectly through UNRWA for refugees, but through direct, publicized projects for the remainder of Jordan’s population. “UNRWA is no USAID,” he complained. End Note. A Palestinian Champion 12. (C) Meetings with any political contact in Jordan, regardless of origin or political persuasion, are likely to descend at some point into a fervent criticism of U.S. policy towards the Palestinians. In meetings with camp residents, however, these speeches are based on personal experience. More often than not, the people of the camps use the hawkish talking points of the IAF when they talk about normalization of relations with Israel, the peace process, and a solution to the conflict. While it is unclear whether the IAF mirrors refugee opinion or vice versa, there is clearly wide support in the camps for what the IAF is saying about the political situation of Palestinians in Jordan and the region. 13. (C) Contacts in several different camps realized that the IAF’s public support for Hamas was unpopular in Jordanian society as a whole, but claimed that it has cost them little among the Palestinians in the camps. In a discussion with refugees in Souf camp, it was clear that support for extremists played a role in their political choices – one contact admitted that he considered the suicide bombers who attacked two hotels in Amman in 2005 “martyrs,” although he qualified his statement (likely for our benefit) by saying that “there are degrees of martyrdom.” 14. (C) Oraib Rantawi, a prominent commentator of Palestinian origin, believes that the Jordanian government has essentially ceded the camps to the Islamists, while at the same time denying them sanctuary elsewhere in Jordan. “It’s easy to demonstrate for the Palestinian cause in Wahdat camp. But it’s impossible to organize such a demonstration in (the East Banker stronghold of) Salt,” he says. Rantawi thinks that Islamists have capitalized on this strategy, creating a deep cultural and political division between the camps and the rest of Jordanian society. In the end, Rantawi wonders why “members of the Muslim Brotherhood have the chance to contact every resident of the camps five times every day,” yet the government has no operational person-to-person contact that can compete. 15. (C) Mohammed Al-Masri, a researcher at the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan who frequently conducts focus groups in the camps, believes that as a result of limiting political space for Palestinians, the IAF has become essentially the only option for the people of the camps (Ref C). “The IAF represents Palestinians more than any other organization in Jordan. There are very few Palestinians in parliament. There is no ‘Jordanian-Palestinian Friendship Organization’ which can advocate for their rights in society. The only organization that is actively pushing the agenda of the Palestinian community is the IAF,” Masri asserts. Support on the Decline? 16. (C) The IAF performed poorly across the board in the November 2007 parliamentary elections, but it did especially poorly among its traditional supporters in the camps. Several theories surfaced about why this was the case – a split in the party, the unpopularity of the IAF’s pro-Hamas rhetoric, or the decline of Muslim Brotherhood-linked parties throughout the Arab world were all put forth as theories for the IAF’s loss (Ref A). Yet our contacts in the camps attribute the IAF’s declining support to one factor only – its inability to deliver services. 17. (C) Said Ajawi, a resident of Irbid camp, told us that residents of the camps are looking for members of parliament who can deliver essential government services that would otherwise fall through the cracks between UNRWA and the government of Jordan. “People want to elect someone who will be able to do something. The residents of the camps used to see the IAF members as good men who could accomplish something. Yet when they got into parliament, they didn’t do anything.” Mohammed Akel, a resident of Souf camp, agrees, saying: “Do they represent me? No, they do not. Their economic program has been a disaster.” 18. (C) It is clear in talking to the people of the camps that while the assistance of Muslim Brotherhood-linked charities is appreciated and needed, it is no substitute for concrete action on the part of the Jordanian government. Abu Ra’ed Darash, a sheikh from Zarqa camp, points out that Islamists have the ability to provide short-term aid to the AMMAN 00001753 004 OF 005 camps, but are essentially unable to deliver long-term support in the form of jobs, training, and infrastructure. “We are looking for government action,” he says. 19. (C) Contacts in some camps also mentioned that assistance from Muslim Brotherhood-linked charities is beginning to take on the unseemly qualities that were previously used by Islamists to characterize the Jordanian government – nepotism, inefficiency, and corruption. “It’s not an open door,” says Afaf Mejdelawi, a resident of Zarqa camp. “They prefer to support their relatives and those who have ‘wasta’ (connections) within the organization.” Suleyman Abu Takhayneh, a resident of Sukhna camp, asserts: “If they come here, we’ll cut off their beards.” He claims that the Muslim Brotherhood-linked charities selectively distribute zakat to blood or ideological allies. Note: Just a few minutes later, however, Abu Takhayneh remarked, “whoever gives me more money, I’ll vote for him.” End Note. 20. (C) Regardless of its ability or inability to deliver services, contacts in the camps talk about the IAF as a much needed check on state power. Bajis Hueitah, a community leader in the Baqa’a camp, told us that people voted for IAF member Mohammed Akel “just to vote against the government – they know that he won’t do anything.” Ibrahim Natour, another Baqa’a resident, insists that people in the camps “don’t like decisions to be imposed on them from above” and see the IAF as a grassroots voice that those in the camps can rely upon to reflect their interests. 21. (C) Throughout Jordan, our contacts noted a sharp increase in the amount of money spent during the November 2007 parliamentary election cycle (Ref D). The advent of the businessman-turned-politician meant an uptick in the amount of “walking around money” disbursed by candidates of all stripes. Residents of the Souf camp talked about a bidding war of sorts between these candidates and the IAF. Realizing that the IAF candidates were politically vulnerable on the service front, independent candidates (who were largely East Bankers) stepped into the void to assert their ability to deliver where the IAF could not. As a consequence, several residents of Souf camp noted that the IAF candidate won a much closer contest than usual, with the majority of his support coming from outside the camp. 22. (C) Despite the decreased numbers of IAF representatives in parliament, it is clear that the IAF still casts a long shadow in the camps, both as a result of its grassroots machine and as a function of its policy preferences. Many in the camps chalk up the popular theories on the IAF’s decline as nothing more than wishful thinking. Said Ajawi says that contrary to popular opinion, the IAF is “not as Islamic as most people in the camps would like” and that residents of the camps are “becoming more conservative” over time. The Roots of Extremism 23. (C) There is a clear divide in the minds of camp residents with whom we spoke between support for political Islam and support for terrorism. Discussions with camp residents on the subject often produce vocal condemnation of Islamist terrorists and their actions. Yet the line between support for “legitimate Palestinian resistance” and support for terrorism is less clear cut, especially when talking about the situation in Palestine proper rather than in Jordan. Regardless of the ideology behind it, contacts in the camps realize that some of their friends and neighbors are among the “misguided”. When asked about what the community is doing about extremists in their midst, the people in the camps that we talked to were divided. 24. (C) The relatively closed social network of the camps can help to stigmatize extremism among friends and relatives, but residents of the camps are careful to point out that self-policing only goes so far. Ibrahim Natour, a resident of Baqa’a camp, acknowledges that while there are distinct advantages of the “tight relations” between members of the camp community, that community is often remiss in bringing those tilting towards extremism back into the fold. He believes that fear of retribution is behind the lack of self-policing within the camps – people know who the extremists are, but the extremists are part of the same social networks and are likely to know their accusers as well. 25. (C) Camp residents are cognizant of the internal factors that allow extremists to find sanctuary in their communities, but also realize that the problem is far bigger than that. Lack of employment opportunity and social despair are frequently cited as reasons that extremism persists in the camps, but the analysis sometimes goes beyond these factors. Contacts in the Jebel Hussein camp drew a direct connection AMMAN 00001753 005 OF 005 between extremism and the “brain drain” from the camps. Salam Hamdan talks about the proliferation of geographically single mothers in the camps. These women have husbands that work in the gulf or elsewhere, and rely on remittances to feed themselves and their children. Yet in the absence of a strong (and present) father figure, Hamdan argues that many of the youth in the camps are easily led astray by the prospect of belonging to a social network. Note: Even those remittances may not be enough. A 2006 study of UNRWA’s special hardship program showed that of the families who receive extra financial assistance, forty-five percent had a female as their effective head of household – four times more than the refugee population as a whole. Eighty-four percent of special hardship cases were dependent primarily on remittance income. End Note. Comment 26. (C) Diverting support away from political Islam in the camps will not be easy. It will require a concentrated effort that deals with the economic, political, and social problems in the camps while creating a workable compromise between liberal ideals and a conservative, religious ideology. Yet perhaps most importantly, it will take a Jordanian government that can connect to the people of the camps on an emotional level. Since the 1971 expulsion of Fatah from Jordan, successive, resource-strapped governments have left the provision of services to UNRWA, while the GID was used to stifle any threatening revival of Palestinian political parties. That left the field fertile and open to exploitation by the Jordanian Muslim Brothers. With issues of identity still dividing Jordan, the fate of the refugees still subject to Israeli-Palestinian negotiation, and a strapped budget, the Jordanian government is unlikely to be motivated to take on controversy by better meeting the needs of its refugee population. In the context of a two-state resolution, however, Jordan will have to face squarely the question of the identity and loyalty of Palestinians who will remain in Jordan, and the obligations of the state toward them. International support and assistance will be essential for Jordan to face successfully what Adnan Abu Odeh called “the moment of truth.” Meanwhile, many of the refugees will remain on the margins, drifting further into despair, and possibly seeking more radical solutions.

Documents

HOW ISLAMISTS INFILTRATED JORDAN’S BAR ASSOCIATION

HOW ISLAMISTS INFILTRATED JORDAN’S BAR ASSOCIATION

10.06.2008 La rédaction

HOW ISLAMISTS INFILTRATED JORDAN’S BAR ASSOCIATION
Date: 2008 June 10, 14:22 (Tuesday) Canonical ID: 08AMMAN1737_a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL Current Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Handling Restrictions — Not Assigned — Character Count: 13961
Executive Order: — Not Assigned — Locator: TEXT ONLINE
TAGS: JO – Jordan | KISL – Islamic Issues |KPAL – Palestinian Affairs | PGOV – Political Affairs–Government; Internal Governmental Affairs Concepts: — Not Assigned —
Enclosure: — Not Assigned — Type: TE
Office Origin: — N/A or Blank — Office Action: — N/A or Blank — Archive Status: — Not Assigned —
From: Jordan Amman Markings: — Not Assigned —
To: Group Destinations Arab Israeli Collective | Secretary of State 

Content Raw content Metadata Print Share Show Headers Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary: Jordan’s Bar Association is controlled by the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (JMB), even though most of the country’s lawyers are not Islamists. The JMB maintains its position in the Bar by exploiting the lack of political engagement on the part of pro-government lawyers and building a base of support among younger attorneys who are more likely to be Islamists. The Jordanian government would like to change this situation, but bureaucratic obstacles stand in the way. In the meantime, the JMB uses the platform of the Bar Association to try to further its political goals within Jordan. End Summary. The JMB’s Political Machine ————————— 2. (C) The most visible parts of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s political machine have always been its political arm, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), and its many charitable affiliates. Yet for several years, the JMB has also used its control of various professional organizations and unions in Jordan to add to its political weight. The associations of engineers, doctors, dentists, and other prominent professions in Jordan are all controlled by the JMB. When the IAF organizes protests and other popular appeals (such as a spate of anti-normalization marches, reftel), it often uses these satellite organizations as proxies who mobilize their membership to echo its political line during the inevitable fiery speeches. The Bar Association is a telling example of the JMB’s use of political tactics, and its ability to fill political spaces that have been neglected or abandoned by pro-government elements. Building the Base —————– 4. (C) Historically, the JMB had only token representation on the board of the Bar Association, which was dominated by nationalists. Former Interior Minister and prominent lawyer Rajai Dajani posits that in the 1990s, changes in the procedures for electing the board began to favor younger members who had the will and organizational strength to guide the elections in their direction. Before that time, the Bar would elect its board and chairman in one round, held early in the association’s one-day annual meeting. Since the late 1990s, the Bar Association has elected its leadership in two rounds – a “primary” early on in the session, and then a decisive vote later in the evening. According to Dajani, the younger, more organized Islamists used the two-tier system to their advantage. “The nationalists would have a barbeque in the evenings, and the IAF members would be voting. We left the election to the younger lawyers. They are mostly Islamists,” he said. Irbid lawyer Shawkat Obeidat told us that of the Bar Association’s 7,500 members, only 3,000 bothered to vote in the last internal election. 5. (C) The changes in the Bar Association’s voting structure led to the election of Saleh Al-Armuti, now a prominent proxy voice for the JMB. Armuti is now in the final year of his second (and final) term as the public face of lawyers in Jordan. He is a fixture at IAF-organized marches, sit-ins, and other political showcases. Nurturing the Base —————— 6. (C) The JMB courts younger members of the Bar Association by helping them get their start. Islamist lawyers benefit from an informal system of referrals guided by the Bar Association’s leadership. This helps younger lawyers build a list of clients and establish their credentials within Islamist circles. Fayyad Al-Qudah, a prominent lawyer and Vice Dean at the University of Jordan’s law faculty, notes that the personal touch of the Islamists and their “provision of services” in the form of institutional support within the Bar Association and attention to the problems that younger lawyers can face when getting settled in the field eventually pay off when it comes to the election period. Former head of the High Court of Justice Faruq Kilani calls this system of favors “corrupt,” but adds that Jordan’s system of “wasta” (“connections”) is deeply ingrained, and part of the way business is done in Jordan. 7. (C) While the JMB does not represent the current crop of lawyers in Jordan, demographics are on its side. As part of its campaign to broaden the responsiveness and capacity of the judiciary, the Ministry of Justice has greatly expanded the number of opportunities in the legal field in recent AMMAN 00001737 002 OF 003 years. Both lawyers and judges tell us that the new cadre of legal professionals is on the whole less qualified (due to shorter training periods) and more likely to hold an Islamist political agenda. The establishment lawyers who were able to tip the balance in the past towards pro-government political positions are slowly retiring or dying off. Several of our contacts predict that the JMB will retain control over the Bar Association for some time to come due to its grassroots strength among younger members. The Liberals – All Talk, No Action ———————————- 8. (C) There is clear agreement among the lawyers and judges we talked to that despite the Muslim Brotherhood’s control over the Bar Association, the majority of rank and file lawyers in Jordan are not Islamists. Qudah juxtaposes the Bar with the Association of Engineers, which is dominated by Muslim Brotherhood members and hence is truly representative of its clientele. “I don’t see (Islamist control of the Bar) as a commitment by the members to a political position,” he says. Obeidat points out that most lawyers in Jordan are actually former judges and government officials who use the legal profession as a golden parachute of sorts. These people naturally gravitate towards a pro-government position that is opposite that of Jordan’s Islamists. 9. (C) Qudah insists that most lawyers in Jordan have “leftist or pan-Arabist” sympathies, but that they fail to take an active interest in who represents them on a national stage. Beyond the procedural changes which favor Islamist candidates, Qudah also cites the absence of viable alternatives from the liberal mainstream that would generate interest in the election’s outcome. “Prominent lawyers aren’t running against them,” he says, opening the field to candidates who may not represent the views of the membership, but are organized enough to win the votes of those who care. Obeidat agrees, saying that the retired government officials who move on to private legal practices are more interested in cashing in than guarding against infiltration by Islamists. 10. (C) Sa’ed Karajah, a lawyer who works with civil society groups, has little sympathy for liberal lawyers who complain about Islamist control over the Bar Association but do little to counter their influence. “Surprise! It’s your own fault,” he admonishes. “Liberal lawyers like to talk a lot, but they do very little. Even when the whole government supports you, it won’t change unless you vote.” While Karajah is a strict secularist who vehemently disagrees with the Muslim Brotherhood’s political stances, he admires the conviction and discipline of the Islamist lawyers that he has met. “It’s about their engagement. They work for what they believe in. If they weren’t there, I would call them – they are the only reason that other parties have to at least pretend to work.” In contrast, Karajah says that liberal lawyers “have no product to sell” and “don’t represent a good model.” 11. (C) MP and lawyer Mahmoud Kharabsheh agrees that political cunning on the part of the Islamists is the key to its success in Bar Association elections. “They exploit all of their chances, and in the end there are no real competitors for them,” he explains. Kharabsheh exemplifies the wishful thinking of many lawyers when he says that Armuti is “just a coordinator” who wields little clout among the lawyers he claims to represent. This may be true, but Armuti still appears to the Jordanian public as a credible voice who speaks on behalf of all lawyers in Jordan. Turning Back the Tide ——————— 12. (C) The Muslim Brotherhood’s control over the Bar Association has not gone unnoticed by the government of Jordan. It is currently seeking to change the regulations that govern membership in the Bar Association. A draft regulation currently under consideration by the association’s board would make membership in the Bar voluntary, rather than the compulsory obligation that it is today. According to the current professional associations law, however, the Bar Association must approve this change before it takes effect. While the regulation would in theory break the power of the Muslim Brotherhood over the legal profession in Jordan by allowing pro-government lawyers to split off into a separate association or resign in protest, Qudah predicts that the Bar will fail to ratify the government’s proposal for another reason. He believes that lawyers are more concerned that a breakup of the Bar Association’s monopoly would diminish the discipline and standards that the profession is currently able to maintain, especially in light of the recent influx of fresh blood. Even Qudah himself would rather allow the IAF to maintain control of the organization rather than risk a further blow to the professionalism of lawyers in Jordan. AMMAN 00001737 003 OF 003 The Political Impact ——————– 13. (C) The JMB’s control over the Bar Association may seem inconsequential in the overall scheme of Jordanian politics – most Jordanians (and perhaps most lawyers) pay little attention to its boilerplate statements in solidarity with the people of Gaza and other causes. Several of our contacts note that the Bar’s JMB-influenced political positions rarely influence policy changes directly. Yet there are troubling signs that the JMB leadership of the Bar Association is actively engaged in policy challenges on the margins. 14. (C) The Bar Association’s Islamist leadership flexed its policy muscles in 2002 during a case that tangentially involved Jordan’s normalization of relations with Israel. Shawkat Obeidat, an Irbid lawyer, was disbarred at Armuti’s behest when he agreed to defend a normalizer. Armuti offered alternative cases to Obeidat, and promised to add him to the unofficial list of recommended lawyers for Islamist clients if he agreed to stop his work on the case. Obeidat refused, and as a consequence his license was revoked by the Islamist-controlled Bar Association board. 16. (C) Islamist control of the Bar Association has touched upon our aid and exchange programs for Jordan’s judiciary. An anti-American protest by lawyers on May 29 at the Palace of Justice caused a postponement of a completion ceremony for a USAID judicial reform project. Note: The GOJ remains strongly committed to Phase II of this program, and bent over backwards to ensure maximum attendance at and publicity for the rescheduled ceremony, which occurred at a different location on June 10. It is unclear if the initial protest was organized or spontaneous, but the JMB exploited it in the press. End Note. In another example, Qudah relayed that he was accused of attempting to “transplant American values” within the Bar Association when he advocated participation in a USG-sponsored exchange program for judges and lawyers. It was only through behind the scenes intervention by non-Islamist elements on the Bar Association’s board that its members were officially allowed to participate on the program. Note: Qudah himself is an alumnus of the International Visitor Leadership Program. End Note. 17. (C) Perhaps a more shadowy consequence of Islamist control over the Bar is its use of the organization’s money. The Bar Association instituted a kind of “intifada tax” on its members in the early 1990s, long before the JMB came to control the organization. The fee, which is automatically withheld as part of the compulsory dues for Bar Association members, is currently in the 20 – 30 JD range (28 – 42 USD) per month. It was traditionally used to support the material needs of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza through Jordanian charitable organizations. Since the JMB took control over the Bar, however, members have become concerned about where the money is going. The Bar’s leadership has been questioned about which charities the money goes to, but has failed to respond in detail. Qudah worries, “they say that it’s paid to charitable institutions in Palestine, but we know that the choice of charities is impacted by the leadership’s political positions.” Obeidat told us that the money used to support lawyers in the Palestinian territories, but now “there is no answer” to the question of where the money goes. Comment ——- 18. (C) Professional associations are a natural space for Jordan’s Islamists to expand their influence. In doing so, they have used the time-tested strategy of building networks through provision of services and patient cultivation of political support. What sets the Bar Association apart is that the Islamists have effectively infiltrated and then maintained control over an organization in which the majority of members are actively against their political views. They have been allowed to fill a vacuum that continues to exist even as Islamists use the Bar Association to promote their political objectives.

Documents

Tariq Ramadan : Brother or not a Brother?

Tariq Ramadan : Brother or not a Brother?

08.06.2008 Caroline Fourest

“I have no functional connection with the Muslim Brotherhood“, Tariq Ramadan made a point of declaring for the benefit of the press. As if the Brotherhood was a party that issued membership cards. As if the lack of a formal tie vindicated the rehabilitation of his grandfather and the teaching of the latter’s thought to European Muslims – without any attempt to adopt a critical perspective. “It’s time to put a stop to these fantasies,” he declared to the Nouvel Observateur. I am independent; there are differences of opinion between me and the Brotherhood in regard to matters of doctrine, even if one of my uncles, Al-Islam al-Banna, is a member of the movement’s governing body.   But you know, the Brotherhood is not a homogeneous organization.   There are differing groups and subgroups….”[1] There are in effect different tendencies within the Brotherhood. But it is important to understand that these differences concern questions of method – never the objectives to be attained. It is quite likely that certain Muslim Brothers do find the heir’s methods a bit too modern for their taste. But that does not make of Tariq Ramadan a modern Muslim! You can be communist without having the party card and disagree with other communists; but that doesn’t turn you into an anarchist. Wherever he goes Ramadan spreads the form Islamism that he inherited. An ambassador for Islamism all the more dangerous and difficult to pin down since he claims to be autonomous. Antoine Sfeir, founder of the Cahiers de l’Orient [The Orient Review] who has written several books on Islamism, and who was one of the first to have exposed Tariq Ramadan’s double-speak is certainly not mistaken in saying: “As far as I’m concerned, he is no doubt one of the key figures of the Brotherhood.” [2] Richard Labévière, an RFI [Radio France International] reporter and author of several books on Islamist terrorism, bears him out. In April 1998, in the course of a trip to Cairo, he had occasion to interview the head of the Brotherhood, Guide Machour. The latter confirmed the fact that belonging to the Brotherhood was not a question of “being a member” or “not being a member”, but a question of adhering to a certain way of thinking; and he added : “The work carried out by Hani and Tariq is totally in keeping with the purest traditions of the Muslim Brotherhood.”[3]

[1] Serge Raffy, “Le vrai visage de Tariq Ramadan [The True Face of Tariq Ramadan], Le Nouvel Observateur, 29 January-4 February 2004.

[2] Interview with Antoine Sfeir, 29 December 2003.

[3] Interview with Richard Labévière, 15 May 2004.

More in Brother Tariq.

Investigation

IMAM SHAFI SHUNS MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND IRANIAN MOSQUE

IMAM SHAFI SHUNS MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND IRANIAN MOSQUE

15.04.2008 La rédaction

(C) IMAM SHAFI SHUNS MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND IRANIAN MOSQUE
Date: 2008 April 15, 16:14 (Tuesday) Canonical ID: 08WINDHOEK106_a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL Current Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Handling Restrictions — Not Assigned — Character Count: 6114
Executive Order: — Not Assigned — Locator: TEXT ONLINE
TAGS: KDEM – Democratization | PGOV – Political Affairs–Government; Internal Governmental Affairs | PINR – Political Affairs–Intelligence | WA – Namibia Concepts: — Not Assigned —
Enclosure: — Not Assigned — Type: TE
Office Origin: — N/A or Blank — Office Action: — N/A or Blank — Archive Status: — Not Assigned —
From: Namibia Windhoek Markings: — Not Assigned —
To: Central Intelligence Agency France Paris | Secretary of Defense Secretary of State Southern African Development Community United Kingdom London

Content Raw content Metadata Print Share Show Headers Classified by Ambassador Dennise Mathieu, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary ——- 1. (C) Namibia’s most senior Imam and head of the Windhoek Islamic Center, Kenyan-born Sheikh Shafi Aziz, told PolOff recently that representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood visited his offices in 2006 and 2007 seeking Shafi’s support to obtain work permits and open a mosque in Namibia. Shafi politely showed them the door and suggested they not return. Shafi also criticized the head of the Iranian-funded Quba Mosque for trying to politicize religion. Separately, he shared insights into the funding of his mosque, the Windhoek Islamic Center. End summary. Muslim Brotherhood Came Calling ——————————- 2. (C) Imam of the Windhoek Islamic Center, Sheikh Shafi Aziz, told PolOff recently that a couple of representatives from the Muslim Brotherhood visited Shafi’s office in 2006 and again in 2007 (exact dates not given) to seek Shafi’s support in obtaining work permits. The Brotherhood representatives were interested in opening a mosque in Namibia and bringing an imam from Egypt. With a tone of disdain, Shafi recounted how he refused to write support letters for the duo, politely telling them that “we can’t vouch for people we don’t know.” Shafi said he was concerned that the Brotherhood would undertake recruiting or unwanted proselytizing for causes that had little to do with what Shafi views as the core of religion – spirituality. He said he had not seen any Muslim Brotherhood representatives since. Quba Mosque: Mixing Politics and Religion? —————————————— 3. (C) In previous meetings, Shafi has avoided criticizing the other Muslim institutions in Namibia. However, when discussing his concerns about mixing politics and religion, Shafi fingered the Iranian-funded Quba Mosque (also in Windhoek) as a culprit. He said the Quba Mosque’s previous and current administrators, neither of whom had extensive religious training, were more interested in political propaganda than religion. In Shafi’s view, Namibia’s Muslim community, largely comprised of converts, is too unfamiliar with Islam and its strictures to start confusing the religious teachings with political discussions about Iraq the U.S. or the Middle East. He pointedly stated that he and his colleagues did not associate with the Quba Mosque. Its political interests made it “an extension of the Iranian Embassy (in Pretoria).” Shafi acknowledged that part of this divergence with the Quba Mosque was the Sunni-Shi’a divide. Shafi did not share any similar concerns about the 13 mosques in the country, most of which the Windhoek Islamic Center shares some affiliation. Funding for the Windhoek Islamic Center ————————————— 4. (C) Possibly as a counterpoint to the aforementioned discussion, Shafi explained the source of funding for his mosque, the Windhoek Islamic Center (WIC). Local businessman, former Ugandan Aziz Kebabi (phonetic) was the prime donor for the purchase of the Center, said Shafi. He explained that Kebabi contributed and pooled support from other Muslims in South Africa and locally. Mosque-goers provide the funding for daily costs, which amount to US$500 for utilities and between US$1,000-1,200 in salaries per month. Although the Saudi Government did not provide start-up costs for the WIC, it recently began providing Ugandan-born Sheikh Ali, the other imam at the WIC, a stipend of approximately $500 per month. It was less clear exactly where Shafi’s salary came from, although it could be a variety of sources in addition to local contributions. For instance, Shafi went on a Saudi Government funded tour to Saudi Arabia in 2007, where he met the King and other leaders. He also travels annually to Kenya, sometimes stopping to preach in Zambia on the way. Comment ——- 5. (C) Shafi is an open-minded moderate who uses every opportunity to speak against intolerance, terrorism, and the misuse of religion for political ends. His explicit criticism of political pandering by the Iranian-run Quba Mosque and his rejection of Muslim Brotherhood overtures are positive signs that the most active leaders of Namibia’s small Muslim community are doing their best to keep their flock on the right path. Given the small size of Namibia’s Muslim community, Shafi would know if extremist elements had taken root. We will continue to develop our relationship with Shafi and encourage him to share any future concerns he may have about undesirable activities in Namibia. End comment. WINDHOEK 00000106 002 OF 002 Bio note ——– 6. (C) Imam Shafi was born on August 16, 1974 in Homa Bay Kenya. He obtained his high school diploma at the Al-Fatah Islamic Institute in Wajir, Kenya in 1998, followed by a BA in Islamic Studies at the Islamic Foundation Al-Jamiah Al-Islmaiiyyah College of Islamic Studies in Mombasa, Kenya in 2006 (partly via correspondence). He simultaneously obtained Single Subject Diplomas in Marketing, International Business, and Public Relations through the Institute of Commercial Management in the UK (distance learning) in 2005. He came to Namibia in 2001 and worked for three years as the Imam of the Majsid Nur (Nur Mosque) in Oshakati, Namibia. He then came to Windhoek to lead the Windhoek Islamic Center. He has two boys and is expecting a third in April 2008. He had a daughter who died after birth. His deceased father was in imam in Kenya. Shafi very factually and without criticism told PolOff that he believes his father cooperated with Kenyan intelligence services, informing them about concerns he had about members of the Muslim community there. Shafi fluently speaks English, Luo, Swahili, and Arabic. MATHIEU

Document

The “National Front” of Islam

A strange consensus has appeared, ranging from the anti-globalization movement to the UMP: the message is that the only way to favour integration is to integrate the fundamentalists… Clearly, Pierre Khalfa and Nicolas Sarkozy want to make more room for fundamentalists (but not for progressive Muslims), whether it is within the European Social Forum (ESF) or the CFCM (French Council of the Muslim Faith). And that is precisely the problem.

Nicolas Sarkozy had promised that fundamentalists would not be invited to sit at the table of the Republic. And yet that is what he has done with the forced union between secular Muslims and fundamentalist Muslims under the CFCM, even if it meant allowing the UOIF (Union of Islamic Organizations of France) and the FNMF (National Federation of Muslims of France) to become the representatives of Islam of France on an equal footing with the Paris Mosque: “I am convinced that when a “radical” is integrated into an official structure, he loses his radicality, because he enters into a dialogue”.

A bad gamble. Any dialogue with the fundamentalists always ends in their favour, and they know it. Pierre Khalfa arrived at the same conclusion. In the 11 November 2014 issue of Le Rebond he stated that integrating “political Islam” is a way of placing Islamic radicality at the service of the anti-globalization movement. And to prove his point and brush away possible reservations, he reminded us that political Christianism – associations like the CCFD (Catholic Committee Against Hunger),

Témoignage chrétien (Christian Witness) or Golias ­ already had their place within this movement. So why not political Muslims? Indeed, there would be nothing shocking about this question if Khalfa also advocated integrating secular and progressive political Muslim movements comparable to the “left wing Catholics” he mentioned. Unfortunately, there is absolutely no equivalence between those he presents as ordinary “political Muslims” and the “liberation theology” or the Young Christian Workers.. On the contrary, they are fundamentalist Muslims at war against modern and progressive Islam.

Has he even read the UOIF propaganda of Tariq Ramadan, of Présence musulmane (Muslim Presence), of the CMF (Muslim Collective of France) and the UJM (Union of Young Muslims), the very associations he wants to make room for within the anti-globalization movement?

Well, I have. And the least that can be said is that I was not bowled over by their faith in progress, equality or secularism. True, the militants of UJM, Présence musulmane and Collectif des musulmans de France are very active in organizing anti-globalization forums, but they are nonetheless anti-feminist, homophobic, puritanical and reactionary. For them it is less a question of becoming an integral part of the anti-globalization movement than developing what Tariq Ramadan calls “spheres of collaboration”, i.e. alliances to move reactionary political Islam forward. “Collaboration does not mean marriage” he reminded his troops, who are terrified at the idea of becoming dissolved in the non Islamic Western culture. But one only has to read the texts of Présence musulmane or the Tawhid publications to realize that the risk is zero. The contempt of these groups towards progressive and secular Muslims – charmingly referred to by Tariq Ramadan as “Muslims without Islam” – has not changed one bit since they became “left wing activists”. This does not mean they are above trying to gain support from “the left” in their fight against progressive and modern Muslims.

Tawhid, which generally only publishes fundamentalist books, was quite happy to publish the book “Les Musulmans face à la mondialisation libérale” (Muslims in the face of liberal globalization) where the name of Pierre Khalfa at last appears alongside Tariq Ramadan. A fine endorsement and a great dialogue between the deaf, as contrary to what Khalfa had probably hoped, the Islamists formed by the Muslim Brotherhood will never change by being in contact with the anti-globalization movement. On the other hand, however, have you remarked how much the anti-racist and anti-globalization movement has changed since it was joined by the fundamentalists? Anti-Semitism is no longer frowned on, they no longer combat racism but “Islamophobia”. Today’s acclaimed feminists are those who wear the veil. The others, the ones fighting against fundamentalist sexism (Muslim or not) are accused of being “racist feminists”. Of all the round-table debates organized in collaboration with the recent FSE in London, the one which beat all the records was the debate on the “hijab and the right to choose”. During the debate France was described as being a racist dictatorship and Bernard Cassen, president of Attac, was booed for simply trying to defend secularism. It was even worse for secularists from the Arab-Muslim world; whenever they tried to address the meeting they were called to order by the fundamentalists!

No, it is not progressive political Islam which has found its place in the anti-globalization movement.. It is the “National Front” ideology of Islam that the anti-globalization movement has so complacently welcomed into its ranks. All in the name of their number one priority, i.e. against American imperialism and Sionism, at the risk of betraying the secular and progressive Muslims that the fundamentalists are fighting. What is the purpose of all this? How come the critical minds of certain progressives are clouded by this racist differentialism when they are confronted by Muslim fundamentalism? Yet they are masters of criticism when it comes to Christian fundamentalism… But most important, how can we imagine a better world if we join up with totalitarians?21

The division among us is as serious as the division caused by Stalinism. No one can just stare at the ceiling waiting for it to pass. The time has come to say no. No to collaborating with fundamentalism, wherever it comes from. For a fairer, freer, more equal and secular world.

FOUREST Caroline, journalist at magazine ProChoix magazine. Most recent publication: Brother Tariq : discourse, strategy et method of Tariq Ramadan, Grasset, 426 pp. 19,50 Euros.21

Libération, 21 December 2004, À 03:34

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