Tariq Ramadan : Violence? What violence?
Extract fom Brother Tariq The doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan
Tariq Ramadan vehemently denies that his grandfather had anything to do with the ever-increasing recourse to violence in the name of Islam. In his eyes, Hassan al-Banna is “by no means the ‘father’ of that ‘modern Islamism’ characterized by violent demonstrations and simplistic, obtuse anti-Western prejudice”.[1] Listening to him, one tends to forget that al-Banna founded a movement that intended to raise high the flag of Islam by whatever means, even if this meant “death on the road to God”: “Despite the portrait given of him by the British colonizers (who, in Egypt and elsewhere, have always accused their opponents of the worst violence and the most horrible crimes) al-Banna never killed anyone, nor arranged for a political assassination,” declared Ramadan in L’Islam en questions[2] – even at the cost of escalating from revisionism to negationism.
Hassan al-Banna was quite explicit in his praise for the armed jihad that he considered to be the highest form of courage. In 1940 he described for the benefit of the Muslim Brotherhood what holy war entailed: “What I mean by holy war (jihad) is the duty that must be obeyed until the day of resurrection and which God’s messenger sets down in these words [….] The first stage in the sacred war is to expel evil from one’s own heart; the highest stage is armed combat in the service of God. The intermediate stages are waging war with one’s voice, one’s pen and one’s hand, and by words of truth addressed to unjust authorities.”[3] This glorification of armed combat as the supreme degree of the jihad was not a vain formula. In the months that followed, the Brotherhood decided to create a secret armed section, the Special Organization. [[See page xx]] Its mission was to prepare a selected number of militants for armed resistance. Tariq Ramadan does not deny the fact, but he describes it as a way of preparing for self-defence, an understandable concern when they were up against the British who might well decide “to physically eliminate their opponents” – or in case “they refused, after repeated urgings, to leave the country”.[4] The truth of the matter is that the Special Organization was primarily engaged in sending militants to fight in Palestine. Even before the creation of Israel in 1947 the Brotherhood sent armed squads to track down the Jewish immigrants. Tariq Ramadan takes pride in recounting these events: “Al-Banna provided assistance to the Palestinians by sending them an advisor and a specialist in military training, raising funds to buy weapons, and setting up training camps that he ran jointly with members of the Special Organization. Volunteers came to Palestine in groups to support the resistance.”[5] Later on, another armed group in Palestine was to claim close links to the Brotherhood… Hamas. Its very existence suffices to refute the idea that the Brotherhood’s ideology has nothing violent or fanatic about it. But Ramadan takes pains to explain that in Palestine violence has nothing violent about it since it is legitimate: “ Hassan al-Banna was opposed to violence and approved of the use of arms only in Palestine as a way of resisting Zionist colonialism.”[6]
Tariq Ramadan was well aware of the fact that his grandfather called for a jihad, but he vindicated him by explaining that the call was strictly limlited to situations of “legitimate defence” or “resistance in the face of injustice”.[7] Two criteria that are highly subjective. On this basis violence was legitimate when it was a question of facing up to Nasser, just as it was in opposing British occupation. Or just as it will be every time that any obstacle threatens to block the Muslim Brotherhood’s quest for domination. Ramadan is brazen enough to claim that the association has never been responsible for acts of violence. Yet in March 1948, for example, a judge was assassinated for having condemned a Muslim Brother. And on the 28th of December of the same year, before al-Banna’s death, the Brotherhood claimed responsibility for the assassination of the Prime Minister Nuqrachi Pacha![8] These deaths could not have occurred without the Guide’s knowledge.
Hassan al-Banna had on occasion barred activists that were in too much of a hurry to go into action, as he did in 1938-1939, not because he repudiated the idea of an armed jihad, but because he found that the time was not ripe. During this period his movement was gaining ground among the people. He was intent on consolidating his political influence, and therefore sought legitimacy. If the Brotherhood were to be condemned for illegal acts, for assassinations or for setting off riots, it would disrupt the evolution of his campaign. In 1948 the Brotherhood went too far; another assassination tipped the scales and the organization was dissolved by military decree. On the 15th of November a demonstration organized by the Brotherhood to honour their “martyrs” degenerated into a riot in which two British officers were killed in their jeep. Those in charge often lost control of the young activists that they had fanaticised. Despite what Tariq Ramadan has said, the organization that his grandfather created was bound to produce fundamentalists who – when it appeared that indoctrination alone would not suffice – would be tempted, sooner or later, to take up arms in order to achieve their objectives. However, the fact that violence was a last resort is considered by Hassan al-Banna’s grandson to be proof of great moderation in their choice of tactics. He turns the cool and calculated radicalism of his grandfather into something more spiritual. By way of example he cites one of al-Banna’s speeches in which the latter tells his followers to carefully weigh the pros and cons of using force, but to take responsibility for whatever course is deemed necessary. “The Muslim Brotherhood will use force only as a last resort, when there is no other choice, and when they are convinced that they have achieved total faith and union. And if they must employ force, they will be dignified and sincere, they will give advance notice and wait for a reply; only then will they advance with nobility and pride, prepared to bear the consequences of their decision with confidence and calm.”[9] In other words, the Muslim Brotherhood has no intention of calling for an armed revolution, but they will be forced to do so if they don’t get their own way. This it what Tariq Ramadan, fascinated by his grandfather’s rhetorical astuteness, calls the Muslim Brotherhood’s “farsightedness”.
[1] Tariq Ramadan, Aux sources du renouveau musulman, op. cit., p. 29.
[2] Alain Gresh, Tariq Ramadan, L’Islam en questions, op. cit., p. 34.
[3] Olivier Carré, Michel Seurat, Les Frères musulmans, op. cit., p. 44.
[4] Tariq Ramadan, Aux sources du renouveau musulman, op. cit., p. 356.
[5] Ibid., p. 22.
[6] Alain Gresh, Tariq Ramadan, L’Islam en questions, op. cit., p. 34.
[7] Tariq Ramadan, Aux sources du renouveau musulman, op. cit., p. 356.
[8] Dictionnaire mondial de l’Islamisme [World Dictionary of Islamism], ed. by Les Cahiers de l’Orient, Paris, Plon, 2002, p. 188.
[9] Tariq Ramadan cassette, “Courants de pensées musulmane contemporaine” op. cit.
Caroline Fourest
Brother Tariq The doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan
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